



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

October 30, 2009

Mr. Dennis R. Madison
Vice President
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
11028 Hatch Parkway North
Baxley, GA 31513

SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000321/2009004 AND 05000366/2009004 AND OFFICE OF
INVESTIGATIONS SYNOPSIS

Dear Mr. Madison:

On September 30, 2009, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 21, 2009, with you and other members of your staff. Also, enclosed is the synopsis of the Office of Investigations (OI) completed investigation that was initiated to determine whether a contractor formerly employed by General Electric (GE) Water Systems willfully failed to report an arrest to Southern Company access authorization officials in order to gain unescorted access to the Hatch Nuclear plant.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. Regarding the investigation, OI did not substantiate that the GE employee willfully failed to report and arrest. Based on the NRC's review of the investigation report no further action is warranted.

SNC

2

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366
License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Enclosures: Inspection Report 05000321/2009004, 05000366/2009004
w/Attachment 1: Supplemental Information
Attachment 2: Office of Investigations Synopsis

cc w/encl: (See page 3)

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief
 Reactor Projects Branch 2
 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366
 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Enclosures: Inspection Report 05000321/2009004, 05000366/2009004
 w/Attachment 1: Supplemental Information
 Attachment 2: Office of Investigations Synopsis

cc w/encl: (See page 3)

X PUBLICLY AVAILABLE NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLE SENSITIVE X NON-SENSITIVE
 ADAMS: Yes ACCESSION NUMBER: _____ X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE **SMS**

OFFICE	RII:DRP	RII:DRP	RII:DRP	RII:DRP	RII:DRP	RII:DRP	RII:DRP
SIGNATURE	Via email	Via email	SMS /RA for/	Via email	Via email	Via email	Via email
NAME	EMorris	ECrowe	MCain	JHickey	PNiebaum	TLighty	TChandler
DATE	10/29/2009	10/29/2009	10/30/2009	10/30/2009	10/29/2009	10/29/2009	10/29/2009
E-MAIL COPY?	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO
OFFICE	RII:DRS	RII:DRS	RII:DRP				
SIGNATURE	JHW /RA for/	CFE /RA/	SMS /RA/				
NAME	MErnstes	CEvans	SShaeffe				
DATE	10/30/2009	10/30/2009	10/30/2009				
E-MAIL COPY?	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO

cc w/encl:
Angela Thornhill
Managing Attorney and Compliance Officer
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution

Jeffrey T. Gasser
Executive Vice President
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution

Raymond D. Baker
Licensing Manager
Licensing - Hatch
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution

L. Mike Stinson
Vice President
Fleet Operations Support
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution

Paula Marino
Vice President
Engineering
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution

Moanica Caston
Vice President and General Counsel
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution

Steven B. Tipps
Hatch Principal Engineer - Licensing
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution

Mr. Ken Rosanski
Resident Manager
Edwin I. Hatch
Oglethorpe Power Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution

Lee Foley
Manager of Contracts Generation
Oglethorpe Power Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution

Arthur H. Dombay, Esq.
Troutman Sanders
Electronic Mail Distribution

Dr. Carol Couch
Director
Environmental Protection
Department of Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution

Cynthia Sanders
Program Manager
Radioactive Materials Program
Department of Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution

Jim Sommerville
(Acting) Chief
Environmental Protection Division
Department of Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution

Mr. Steven M. Jackson
Senior Engineer - Power Supply
Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia
Electronic Mail Distribution

Mr. Reece McAlister
Executive Secretary
Georgia Public Service Commission
Electronic Mail Distribution

Chairman
Appling County Commissioners
County Courthouse
69 Tippins Street, Suite 201
Baxley, GA 31513

SNC

4

Letter to Dennis R. Madison from Scott M. Shaeffer dated October 30, 2009

SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000321/2009004 AND 05000366/2009004 AND OFFICE OF
INVESTIGATIONS SYNOPSIS

Distribution w/encl:

C. Evans, RII

L. Slack, RII

OE Mail

RIDSNRRDIRS

PUBLIC

RidsNrrPMHatch Resource

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366

License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Report Nos.: 05000321/2009004 and 05000366/2009004

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

Location: Baxley, Georgia 31513

Dates: July 1 – September 30, 2009

Inspectors: E. Morris, Senior Resident Inspector
E. Crowe, Senior Resident Inspector at Farley
M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector at Vogtle
J. Hickey, Senior Resident Inspector at Robinson
P. Niebaum, Resident Inspector
T. Lighty, Project Engineer
T. Chandler, Resident Inspector at Vogtle

Approved by: Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000321/2009-004, 05000366/2009-004; 07/01/2009-09/30/2009; Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, integrated report

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by four senior resident inspectors, two resident inspectors, and one project engineer. No violations or findings of significance were identified.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at or near full Rated Thermal Power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at or near full RTP until a condenser water box tube leakage occurred on July 12, which resulted in increased reactor coolant system conductivity and chloride concentration. Operators took actions to reduce reactor power to approximately 37% RTP in accordance with established chemistry parameter procedural guidelines. Unit 2 returned to 100% RTP on July 18 and remained at or near full RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather

a. Inspection Scope

External Flooding. The inspectors performed a review of licensee readiness to cope with external flooding. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the systems listed below to verify that equipment was in place to mitigate the potential impacts from external flooding. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 34AB-Y22-002-0, Naturally Occurring Phenomena, to verify guidance existed to cope with an external flood. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed licensee documentation that shows design flood levels for area containing safety-related equipment. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- Unit 1 & 2 plant service water
- Unit 1 & 2 residual heat removal service water (RHRSW)
- 1B emergency diesel generator (EDG) standby service water system

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial Walkdowns. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following three systems when the opposite train was removed from service, a remaining operable system/train with high risk significance for the plant configuration exists, or a system/train that was recently realigned following an extended system outage or a risk significant single train system exists. The inspectors checked system valve positions,

Enclosure

electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the operability of the opposite trains or components by comparing the position listed in the system operating procedure to the actual position. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- Unit 1 A train of standby liquid control system while B train was out of service for maintenance
- Unit 1 A EDG while the 1B EDG was out of service for maintenance
- Unit 1 B residual heat removal (RHR) train while the A RHR train was out of service for maintenance

Complete System Walkdown. The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system. This inspection sample was completed using the guidance listed in Operating Experience Smart Sample: OpESS FY2009-02, Negative Trend and Recurring Events Involving Feedwater Systems. The inspectors performed a detailed check of valve positions, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the operability of the system or components by comparing the required position in the system operating procedure to the actual position. The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed control room logs to verify that alignment and equipment discrepancies were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Fire Area Tours. The inspectors toured the following five risk significant plant areas to assess the material condition of the fire protection and detection equipment, verify fire protection equipment was not obstructed, and that transient combustibles were properly controlled. The inspectors reviewed the Fire Hazards Analysis drawings H-11846 and H-11847 to verify that the necessary fire fighting equipment; such as fire extinguishers, hose stations, ladders, and communications equipment; was in place. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- Unit 2 reactor building northeast diagonal RHR and core spray (CS) pump room
- Unit 2 reactor building northwest diagonal reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) pump and turbine room
- Unit 2 reactor building southeast diagonal RHR and CS pump room
- Unit 2 reactor building southwest diagonal control rod drive pump room
- Unit 2 reactor building HPCI pump and turbine room

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Internal Flood Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected risk-important plant design features and licensee procedures intended to protect the plant and its safety-related equipment from internal flooding events. The inspectors reviewed flood analysis and design documents, including the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), engineering calculations and abnormal operating procedures for licensee commitments. The inspectors walked down the area listed below to verify plant design features and plant procedures for flood mitigation were consistent with design requirements and internal flooding analysis assumptions. The inspectors reviewed flood protection barriers, which included plant floor drains, condition of room penetrations, condition of the sumps in the rooms, and condition of water-tight doors. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports (CRs) to verify the licensee was identifying and resolving problems. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- Unit 1 reactor building elevations 158' and 130'

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

Resident Quarterly Observation

The inspectors observed the performance of licensee simulator scenario LT-SG-51068-03, which included a load reduction due to circulating water pump trip, a loss of reactor water level indication, and a small loss of coolant accident that resulted in an automatic reactor scram due to high drywell pressure. The inspectors reviewed the proper classification in accordance with the Emergency Plan and licensee procedures 10AC-MGR-019-0, Procedure Use and Adherence, and DI-OPS-59-0896, Operations Management Expectations, to verify formality of communication, procedure usage, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory oversight. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique of operator performance to assess if the licensee identified performance issues were comparable to those identified by the inspectors. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the critique results from previous training sessions to assess performance improvement.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

For the following four time periods below, the inspectors reviewed Plan of the Day documents to verify that risk assessments were performed prior to components being removed from service. The inspectors reviewed the risk assessment and risk management controls implemented for these activities to verify they were completed in accordance with licensee procedure 90AC-OAM-002-0, Scheduling Maintenance, and 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors assessed whether any increase in risk was promptly assessed and that appropriate risk management actions were implemented.

- July 4 through July 10, Unit 1 RCIC pressure switch functional test and calibration (FT&C), Unit 1 reactor water level differential pressure FT&C, 2D RHRSW pump replacement
- July 11 through July 17, 1B standby service water pump out of service for maintenance, 1C condensate booster pump out of service for design change, 1A reactor building closed cooling water pump out of service for maintenance
- July 18 through July 24, Unit 1 RHR surveillance testing, Unit 1 reactor manual scram functional Test, 2H 125 volt direct current (VDC) battery charger preventive maintenance
- August 15 through August 21, Altamaha River dredging, 1B EDG out of service, Unit-2 HPCI system for planned maintenance

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following four operability evaluations and compared the evaluations to the system requirements identified in the Technical Specifications (TS) and the UFSAR to ensure operability was adequately assessed and the system or component remained available to perform its intended function. Also, the inspectors assessed the adequacy of compensatory measures implemented as a result of the condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- U1 and U2 HPCI and RCIC flow controller power supplies with electrolytic capacitors
- U1 and U2 safety relief valves
- U1 1E 125 VDC battery charger discolored wire identified

Enclosure

- U2 2D RHRSW pump minimum flow valve failed to fully close

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following two plant temporary modifications (TM) to ensure that safety functions of important safety systems have not been affected. Also, the inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of risk significant structures, systems and components have not been degraded through modifications. The inspectors verified that any modifications performed during increased risk-significant configurations did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- TM 2-09-009, installation of stainless steel spacer in standby service water system check valve, 2P41F321
- TM 2-09-010, installation and removal of blind flange isolating 1B EDG from the standby plant service water pump, 2P41-C002

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the following five post maintenance tests, the inspectors reviewed the test scope to verify the test demonstrated the work performed was completed correctly and the affected equipment was functional and operable in accordance with TS requirements. The inspectors also reviewed equipment status and alignment to verify the system or component was available to perform the required safety function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- Rebuild of standby diesel plant service water pump, 2P41-C002
- Replacement of standby gas treatment filter inlet air operated valve, 1T48-F001B, operator seal
- Inspection of 1C RHR service water pump suction pit
- Cleaning of piping for 1B EDG standby service water
- Unit 2 RCIC pump power supply

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records for the following five surveillances to determine if the scope of the test adequately demonstrated the affected equipment was operable. The inspectors reviewed these activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure AG-MGR-21-0386, Evolution and Pre-and Post-Job Brief Guidance, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Surveillance Tests

- 34SV-E41-002-1, HPCI Pump Operability, Ver. 25.16
- 57SV-S32-002-2, Emergency Buses 2E, 2F & 2G [Under Voltage] Relay FT&C, Ver. 12.11
- 34SV-X43-001-1 Fire Pump Test, Ver. 1.8
- 34SV-R43-003-1, Diesel Generator 1C Monthly Test, Ver. 16.17

In-Service Test

- 34SV-E21-001-1, Core Spray Pump Operability, Ver. 18.7

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the following emergency plan evolution. The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator and Technical Support Center to verify implementation of licensee procedure 10AC-MGR-006-0, Hatch Emergency Plan. The inspectors reviewed the classification of the simulated events and the development of protective action recommendations to verify these activities were conducted in accordance with licensee procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedure 73EP-EIP-073-0, Onsite Emergency Notification, to verify the proper offsite notifications were made. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to assess the licensee's effectiveness in identifying areas of improvement. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Enclosure

- Emergency Plan drill conducted on September 16, 2009

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Daily Screening of Corrective Action Items

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensee's computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.

.2 Annual Sample

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed review of the operator workarounds list to verify the full extent of the issues were identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized.

- Operations significant workarounds and burdens dated September 02, 2009.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Followup

.1 Unit-2 Load Reduction from 100% to 37% due to Condenser Water Box Tube Leakage

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that the operators responded correctly and in accordance with the applicable abnormal operating procedures as this event developed. Additionally, the inspectors held discussions with licensee Chemistry, Operations and Engineering departments to gain an understanding of the events and assess followup actions. The inspectors later reviewed the licensee's apparent cause determination to assess the detail of the review, adequacy of the apparent cause and corrective actions prior to returning the unit to full RTP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

Enclosure

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors observed security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.

These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors' normal plant status review and inspection activities.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Resident Inspector Observation of Helium Leak Rate Testing of Holtec Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed Helium leak rate testing of Holtec MPC serial number 0199 utilizing the inspection guidance found in NRC Inspection Procedure 60853. The inspectors verified the leak testing procedure was performed satisfactorily and the leak testing results were within the acceptance criteria. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Report Review

During this inspection period the final INPO Evaluation Report dated November 2008 was reviewed. The report contained no safety issues which were not already known by the NRC.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On October 21, 2009, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Madison and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

Enclosure

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Enclosure

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

S. Bargeron, Plant Manager
G. Brinson, Operations Manager
J. Dixon, Health Physics Manager
B. Hulett, Engineering Design Manager
G. Johnson, Engineering Director
J. Lewis, Site Support Manager
D. Madison, Hatch Vice President
S. Soper, Engineering Support Manager
J. Thompson, Nuclear Security Manager
R. Varnadore, Maintenance Manager

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Opened & Closed

None

Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather

Condition Report

2003008711

Other

Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Hatch

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

Procedures

34SO-E11-010-1, Residual Heat Removal System, Ver. 34.0

34SO-E21-001-1, Core Spray System, Ver. 21.4

34SO-R43-001-1, Diesel Generator Standby AC System, Ver. 23.8

34SO-E41-001-2, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System, Ver. 22.18

34SV-E41-001-2, HPCI Valve Operability, Ver. 10.14

34SO-C41-003-1, Standby Liquid Control System, Ver. 10.15

Drawings

H-16329, H-16330, H-16331, H-26020, H-27664, H-16061

Condition Reports

2008100154 2008100163 2008100333

2008103183 2008110317 2009102746

2009105337 2009106415 2009106783

2009107497 2009107681

Other

HPCI System Health Report 2nd QTR 2009

LT-LP-00501-04, HPCI System Lesson Plan

Required Action Sheet (RAS) 2-08-005

WO 2091311101

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Drawings

A-43965 sheets 99,100, 101, 102, and 103

Section 1R06: Internal Flood Protection

Condition Reports

2009105615, 2009105731, 2009105744

Documents

Plant Hatch Individual Plant Examination (IPE) Volume 1, Section 3.3.8 Internal Flooding Analysis

Unit 1 UFSAR, Section 12.2.1, Reactor Building, Revision 19

Unit 2 UFSAR, Section 3.8.4.1. Description of Structures, Revision 26

Unit 2 UFSAR, Supplement 15A, Design against High Energy Pipe Breaks Outside the Primary Containment, Revision 26

Work Orders

1090983501

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification

Drill Scenario LT-SG-51068-03, Rev. 3

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

Condition Reports

2009105846

Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations

Condition Reports

2009107497, 2009102787, 2008109412, 2009108041, 2004107568

Procedure

34SV-E11-004-2, RHRSWJ Pump Operability, Ver. 15.6

Document

LR-REG-011-1002, Operability evaluation for the RHRSW Pump

Work Order

1072625501

Prompt Determinations of Operability

1-09-05, 2-09-05, 01-09-04 rev. 1, 2-09-03 rev. 1,

Section 1R18: Plant Modifications

Licensing Documents

Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications 3.7.3 Diesel Generator 1B Standby Service Water System

Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases B3.7.3 Diesel Generator 1B Standby Service Water System

Unit 1 and Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, section 9.2.1, Plant Service Water System

Work Order

2091366212, 2091366215

Drawings

H-21033, H-11600

Section 1R19: Post Maintenance Testing

Work Orders

2091674901, 2091476305, 2091716416, 2091716409, 2091716417, 2091716421, 2091716401, 2091578701, 2091579001, 2091528501, 2091579101, 2091536601, 2070186201, 2091443401, 2091366204, 2091366216, 2091366217, 1091630001, 1080400601

Condition Reports

2009107497, 2009107681, 2009106714

Procedures

34SV-P41-003-2, Standby Diesel Service Water System Operability, Rev. 4.5
34SV-P41-003-2, Standby Diesel Service Water System Operability, Rev. 4.6
34SO-P41-005-2, Standby Diesel Service Water System, Rev. 8.8
34SV-E51-002-2, RCIC Pump Operability, Ver. 20.11
34SV-E51-005-2, Operation of RCIC from the Remote Shutdown Panel, Ver. 0.4
31GO-INS-001-0, Pump and Valve Inservice Testing, Ver. 11.2
34SV-E11-004-1, RHRSW Pump Operability, Ver. 18.7
90AC-OAM-001-0, Test and Surveillance Control, Ver. 0.3
34SV-T46-002-1, Standby Gas Treatment System Damper Operability, Ver. 6.10
52CM-MME-053-0, Bettis 744 A-1 SR Actuators, Ver. 0.4

Other

Plant Hatch 4th Interval Pump and Valve IST Basis Document for Unit 2
Required Action Sheets (RAS) 2-09-111 and 112

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

Procedures

34SV-E41-002-1, HPCI Pump Operability, Ver. 25.16
52PM-E41-005-0, Manual Check of HPCI Mechanical Overspeed Trip, Ver. 3.8
34SV-E21-001-1, Core Spray Pump Operability, Ver. 18.7

Work Orders

2090064301

Drawing

H-16332

Condition Reports

2009200225, 2009200226

Other

Unit 1 and Unit 2 main control room logs

Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation

EP Exercise Narrative and Timeline for drill conducted 9/16/09
Drill ENN Forms from drill conducted 9/16/09

Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems

Documents

RER H1071078801, Plant Hatch U1 RHR Pump Vibration Summary Report
Operating Order OO-02-0709, Operation of the "B" RHR Loop

Procedure

DI-OPS-61-1196, Control and Tracking of Operator Workarounds, Ver. 4.0

Section 4OA3: Event Follow-up

Procedures

64-CH-SAM-025-0, Reactor Coolant Sampling and Analysis, Ver. 18.3
34AB-N61-001-2, Condenser Tube Leaks/Chemical Intrusion, Ver. 2.4

Condition Reports

2009106989, 2007107007

Section 4OA5: Other Activities

Procedures

MSLT-MPC-HOLTEC, Helium Mass Spectrometer Leak Test Procedure using the Hood
Technique, Revision No. MPC-Field-LT-02

Condition Report

2009107859

SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Investigations (OI), Region II (RII), on December 5, 2008, to determine whether a contractor formerly employed by General Electric Water Systems (GE), willfully failed to report an arrest to Southern Company (SC) access authorization officials in order to gain unescorted site access (UA) to the Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP)

Based on the evidence developed during this investigation, OI:RII did not substantiate that the former GE contract employee willfully failed to report an arrest to SC access authorization personnel at HNP. OI:RII did, however, determine that the employee violated applicable procedures associated with the reporting of information for the purpose of gaining UA.

Approved for release 10/23/2009, Oscar de Miranda

~~NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WITHOUT APPROVAL OF
FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, REGION II~~

Official Use Only -- Investigation Information

Case No. 2-2009-011

Attachment 2